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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 16-2107 
______________ 
 
AMERICAN ATELIER, INC., 
    Appellant 
   
v. 
 
MATERIALS, INC. 
  
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 5-13-cv-07138) 
District Judge: Hon. Gerald A. McHugh 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 13, 2017 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
  
(Filed: January 18, 2017) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
  
                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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  American Atelier, Inc. (“AAI”) appeals from the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment in favor of Materials, Inc., on AAI’s claims for breach of the implied 
warranty of merchantability and breach of contract.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
will affirm.   
I 
 AAI manufactures furniture for the hospitality industry.  Loews Hotels hired AAI 
to manufacture furniture for its Philadelphia hotel.  Loews and its interior designer 
required that the furniture incorporate white veneers made of anigre wood that were 
manufactured by Tabu, an Italian company.  Tabu creates these white veneers by 
bleaching and dying anigre wood, which is brown in its natural state.   
 AAI entered into a contract to purchase the veneers from Materials, the exclusive 
distributor for Tabu products in the United States.  AAI manufactured the furniture using 
the veneers, and Loews installed the furniture in its hotel rooms.  Several months after the 
furniture was installed, Loews complained that the portions of the veneers that were 
exposed to light had discolored to an unattractive yellow-brown shade, while veneers not 
exposed to light remained white.  Loews demanded that AAI replace all of the discolored 
veneers.  AAI ultimately replaced them with maple veneers.   
 AAI sought to recover the costs associated with replacing the veneers and sued 
Materials, alleging, among other things, claims for breach of the implied warranty of 
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merchantability and breach of contract.1  Following discovery, Materials filed a motion 
for summary judgment.  The District Court granted the motion in part, concluding that 
AAI could not establish that the veneers were defective because bleached veneers are 
inherently prone to discoloration, and the contract had not been breached.2  AAI appeals. 
II3 
                                              
1 The District Court dismissed AAI’s claim for breach of the implied warranty of 
fitness for a particular purpose, concluding that the contract expressly disclaimed that 
warranty.  AAI did not appeal this ruling.   
2 The District Court entered a final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(b) with respect to these claims but denied summary judgment and retained 
jurisdiction over a claim that certain veneers were moldy.  The decision to certify a 
judgment as final is “left to the sound judicial discretion of the district court,” Curtiss-
Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980), to which we give “substantial 
deference,” id. at 10.  Of course, “sound judicial administration does not require that Rule 
54(b) requests be granted routinely,” id., given the “historic federal policy against 
piecemeal appeals,” id. at 8 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  The District 
Court recognized this policy when it found that certification here “would not result in 
piecemeal appeals of [the] different claims,” but rather would facilitate litigation, avoid 
unnecessary expenses, and possibly prevent the need for a trial on the smaller claim 
based on the moldy veneers.  App. A23. 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Elliott v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 682 F.3d 
213, 219 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Under Rule 54(b), however, a district court may convert an 
order adjudicating less than an entire action to the end that it becomes a ‘final’ decision 
over which a court of appeals may exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”).  Our 
review of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary.  Mylan Inc. v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 723 F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2013).  We apply the same 
standard as the District Court, viewing facts and making all reasonable inferences in the 
non-movant’s favor.  Hugh v. Butler Cty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 266-67 (3d Cir. 
2005).  Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a).  “An issue is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a 
reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, and a factual dispute is material 
only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.”  Kaucher v. Cty. of 
Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).  The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when 
the non-moving party fails to make “a sufficient showing on an essential element of [its] 
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A 
 We will first address AAI’s claim for breach of the implied warranty of 
merchantability.  Under Pennsylvania law,4 “a warranty that the goods shall be 
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect 
to goods of that kind.”  13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2314(a).  The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court has explained that  
[t]he concept of “merchantability” does not require that the goods be the 
best quality, or the best obtainable, but it does require that they have an 
inherent soundness which makes them suitable for the purpose for which 
they are designed, that they be free from significant defects, that they 
perform in the way that goods of that kind should perform, and that they be 
of reasonable quality within expected variations and for the ordinary 
purpose for which they are used. 
 
Gall by Gall v. Allegheny Cty. Health Dep’t, 555 A.2d 786, 789–90 (Pa. 1989) (citations 
omitted).  Thus, to establish a breach of this warranty, a plaintiff must show, among other 
things, that the product at issue was defective.  Altronics of Bethlehem, Inc. v. Repco, 
Inc., 957 F.2d 1102, 1105 (3d Cir. 1992).  A plaintiff can meet this burden by proving 
that the product “functioned improperly in the absence of abnormal use and reasonable 
secondary causes.”  Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).    
 AAI argues that the veneers were defective because they turned to a shade of 
brown that was unacceptable and required replacement.  However, this color change does 
not indicate that the veneers “functioned improperly.” Altronics, 957 F.2d at 1105 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  As AAI’s expert reports explain, 
                                                                                                                                                  
case with respect to which [it] has the burden of proof.”  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 
4 The parties do not dispute that Pennsylvania law applies.   
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bleached veneers are inherently susceptible to discoloration as a result of light exposure.  
Accordingly, the fact that veneers exposed to less light retained their color and that 
veneers exposed to light discolored is entirely consistent with how they were expected to 
function and thus is not evidence that they were not of a “reasonable quality” for 
bleached veneers.  Gall, 555 A.2d at 789.  Therefore, while bleached veneers may have 
more limited uses than non-bleached veneers because bleached veneers used in areas 
exposed to light may change color, the veneers here were “suitable” for ordinary use in 
furniture and performed in line with “the way that goods of that kind should perform.”  
Id.  Because AAI has not produced evidence from which a jury could conclude that 
Materials’ veneers were defective, we will affirm the District Court’s ruling on AAI’s 
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability claim.   
B 
 AAI’s breach of contract claim also fails.5  To prove a claim for breach of 
contract, a plaintiff must show that (1) a contract existed between the parties, (2) the 
defendant breached a duty imposed by that contract, and (3) the plaintiff suffered 
                                              
5 In its reply brief, AAI suggests that it did not have an opportunity to oppose 
summary judgment on its breach of contract claim because Materials’ motion for 
summary judgment explicitly addressed only the claim for breach of the warranty of 
merchantability.  A court is required to give a party notice that it is considering granting 
summary judgment and an opportunity to oppose summary judgment.  Gibson v. Mayor 
& Council of City of Wilmington, 355 F.3d 215, 222–23 (3d Cir. 2004).  Here, AAI 
received such notice and had the opportunity to respond.  AAI filed a brief in opposition 
to Materials’ motion for summary judgment on the warranty claim, which overlapped 
substantially with the breach of contract claim; the District Court sent a notice to the 
parties indicating that it was considering granting summary judgment on AAI’s entire 
complaint and cancelling the trial date; and the District Court permitted the parties to file 
supplemental briefs and present oral arguments.  Thus, AAI’s claim that it had no 
opportunity to defend its breach of contract claim lacks merit.   
6 
 
damages as a result.  McShea v. City of Phila., 995 A.2d 334, 340 (Pa. 2010).  There is 
no dispute that the parties had a contract.  The contract required Materials to supply white 
anigre veneers.  AAI asserts that this requirement was breached because the veneers 
provided did not remain white.  While it is true that the veneers that were exposed to light 
changed color, the contract specifically notified AAI that discoloration could occur.  See 
App. A341 (“All wood surfaces, like all materials, will alter in color due to exposure to 
ultraviolet (UV) light or simply aging of the wood.”).  In addition, the contract 
specifically stated that “[s]ince [Materials] has no control over end products fabricated 
with the materials sold, no warranty is expressed or implied. . . . [Materials] makes no 
warranty based on any usage of trade or fitness for any particular use.  Buyer assumes all 
risks resulting from the use with other substances or in any process.”  App. A341.  Tabu 
provided the veneers to Materials, Materials distributed them to AAI, and AAI used the 
veneers in the furniture.  Materials explicitly notified AAI that it made no warranty 
concerning such products and by entering into the contract, AAI thereby disclaimed any 
warranty covering the product when used in the way AAI did—in furniture that would be 
placed in areas exposed to light.  Thus, aware there were no warranties, AAI received 
what it was promised, white anigre veneers.   
 AAI also argues that Materials breached the contract because the contract states 
that Materials “stand[s] behind the recommendations of the [Architectural Woodwork 
Institute (‘AWI’)] Architectural Woodwork Quality Standards,” App. A341, and these 
standards state that bleached veneers should be avoided because of potential finishing 
problems.  AAI apparently takes the position that Materials breached the contract by 
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selling bleached veneers because the AWI standards discourage the use of bleached 
veneers.  The sole purpose of the contract, however, was the sale of bleached veneers.  To 
conclude that Materials was prohibited from selling such products because of its general 
statement that it “stand[s] behind” AWI’s recommendations would be illogical and thus 
unreasonable.  We are obligated to give the contract a “reasonable construction,” Mellon 
Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1011 (3d Cir. 1980) (citation 
omitted), and it is not reasonable to conclude that a contract for the sale of bleached 
veneers simultaneously prevents the sale of bleached veneers.  See id. at 1012 n.13 (“If 
no ‘reasonable’ alternative meanings are put forth, then the writing will be enforced as 
the judge reads it on its ‘face.’” (citation omitted)).  Accordingly, we agree with the 
District Court that these standards are not a strict limitation on the products Materials is 
permitted to sell.  Therefore, we will affirm the District Court’s ruling on AAI’s breach 
of contract claim.   
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment in favor of Materials.   
